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Abstract. The European Union sees the inclusion of many Eastern European states –
enlargement – as a natural progression in the process of building an ‘ever closer union’. For
the European Commission in particular, the process of enlargement (broadening) is part
of the process of integration and acts as a complement to the development of a stronger role
for the European Union and its institutions or deepening of integration. Yet as the ﬁrst
Irish referendum on the Nice Treaty showed, not all of European’s citizens see the two pro-
cesses of enlargement and integration in the same light. This article addresses two
related questions.First,how are attitudes towards deepening and broadening related,and do
European citizens see them as complementary or contradictory? Second, and related to the
ﬁrst, what factors drive popular attitudes towards enlargement?
Introduction
The European Union (EU) sees the inclusion of many Eastern European
states – enlargement – as a natural progression in the process of building an
‘ever closer union’.For the European Commission in particular,the process of
enlargement (broadening) is part of the process of integration and acts as a
complement to the development of a stronger role for the EU and its institu-
tions or deepening of integration (see European Commission,2003).Yet as the
ﬁrst Irish referendum on the Nice Treaty showed, not all of the EU’s citizens
see the two processes of enlargement and integration in the same light.In June
2001, Ireland’s voters (among the more enthusiastic pro-Europeans) defeated
the Nice proposals to revise European’s institutions in light of enlargement by
a margin of 54 to 46.
1At least in some instances,then,some Europeans do not
see enlargement and integration within the EU as complementary;rather,they
see that one may pose a threat to the other. How general is this sense that
broadening and deepening may not be two aspects of the same process, but
two different processes? Furthermore, if they are seen as two different pro-
cesses, what leads citizens to support or have doubts about those processes?
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MA 02148, USAWe will examine in this article models of citizen opinion towards both
broadening (enlargement) and deepening (further integration in existing
policy areas). We ﬁnd that attitudes towards the two processes do overlap,
but are also distinct in ways that allow us to identify several broad groups.
Alongside ardent pro-Europeans and ardent anti-integrationists, we are able
to identify a third group that we label ‘hesitant Europeans’.This is a group of
some interest.Unlike others,they have not already made up their minds about
the European project one way or the other, but occupy a middle category:
citizens who may be generally supportive of integration, but are not yet per-
suaded of the virtues of current developments.It is not yet clear whether these
doubts will lead this middle group to develop into ardent integrationists or
ardent anti-integrationists.What is clear is that many of the doubts are tied to
instrumental and, to some extent, institutional evaluations of the EU.
Attitudes towards European integration
In May 2004,following accession negotiations that began in the late 1990s,the
EU achieved an historic transformation, expanding from 15 to 25 Member
States, and thereby increasing its population by a ﬁfth and its surface area by
a quarter. The new Member States range from the tiny (Malta) to the large
(Poland); eight of the ten new members are former communist countries
(Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and
Slovenia) and two others (Bulgaria and Romania) are expected to join by
2007.
2 Other possible entrants include the Balkan countries and Turkey.
Not all Europeans are especially welcoming to these new entrants. One
interpretation of the enlargement issue is that it is a test of the depth of
support for integration in general.For years,opinion towards the EU was seen
in terms of a ‘permissive consensus’. While popular support may not have
been very high,outright opposition,a possibly more important set of opinions,
was often quite low since many aspects of integration seemed of little or
no relevance to voters or national political systems (see, e.g., Westle 1995).
However, as integration moves into policy areas such as a single currency and
seeks to allow many more countries into the club, the EU is no longer of low
salience. At this point, the passive permission of voters may grow into
opposition. The political relevance of that opposition was seen in the Irish
rejection of the Nice Treaty.
How, then, are we to understand popular opinions towards enlargement in
light of previous work on public opinion towards Europe? One possibility is
that responses towards enlargement will simply follow a variant of existing
patterns. One set of factors underlying responses to the EU is the presence
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instrumentalist evaluations support for integrationist policies such as enlarge-
ment can, and for Euro-federalists should, be attached to an underlying com-
mitment to the idea of Europe.A consistent pattern of results have shown that
younger and better educated voters see themselves not so much as members of
a particular national group,but as Europeans (see,e.g.,Duchesne and Frognier
(1995) and,for discussion in relation to post-materialism:Janssen (1991)).This
kind of pan-European nationalism,then,is likely to be associated with support
for enlargement while nationalism – and possibly right-wing ideology – should
motivate hostility towards enlargement.An even simpler way of phrasing this
is to posit that if voters are already against the EU they will not be in favour
of enlargement. On the other hand, if they are already predisposed towards
the EU they are likely to favour enlargement as part of the move towards
integration. While a strong version of this argument would see support for
enlargement as an afﬁrmation of a pan-European nationalism, a weaker
version would see attitudes to enlargement in terms of the ‘permissive con-
sensus’ we mentioned above.Respondents to enlargement as a speciﬁc issue in
general or in the abstract will apply a general, even fuzzy, regard for Europe.
Here,the idea of a European identity may work in two ways.Doubts about
integration may be tied to the respondent’s own lack of a European identity
and his or her misgivings about an ‘ever closer union’. Or, perhaps, doubts
about new entrants could be tied to the respondent’s doubts that the new
entrants are sufﬁciently European. It is not the respondent who is or is not
European, but the new entrants who may not be seen as being European. For
some,then,the broadening of the EU to embrace Eastern Europe may not,for
citizens,be the same as deepening since Slovakians andTurks may not be seen
as ‘real’ Europeans. If respondents do indeed make a distinction between
broadening and deepening,then that fact alone suggests a different process of
opinion formation than a ‘permissive consensus’.
A second set of explanations for attitudes towards enlargement comes
from the literature on popularity functions and the EU (see,e.g.,Eichenberg &
Dalton 1993; Anderson 1998; Gabel 1998; Gabel & Palmer 1995; Gabel &
Whitten 1997; Hix 1999). In this literature, opinion towards Europe is driven
by a healthy component of self-interest. Employment in certain sectors of
the economy that are expected to do well from EU membership is associated
with support from the EU, as is being a citizen of a state beneﬁting from net
transfers (Eichenberg & Dalton 1993; Carrubba 1997). Similarly, not being in
a state seen to beneﬁt in such a material manner from the EU may well be
associated with low support for integration (e.g., Smith & Wanke 1993; Gabel
1998; Banducci et al. 2003). Leaving aside the question of whether these
perceptions are primarily driven by concerns over pocketbook or sociotropic
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narrowly deﬁned streak of self-interest underlying attitudes towards the EU.
In which case, responses towards enlargement are likely to be driven by
short-term instrumental concerns such as,for example,a concern over how the
entry of new countries may provide additional beneﬁts or costs.Following this
line of reasoning, attitudes toward enlargement are likely to depend on what
countries are being considered; wealthier countries are expected to enjoy
greater acceptance than poorer countries.
Concern over how subsidy patterns will shift is also likely to shape attitudes
toward enlargement.Some regions (e.g.,in Ireland and in some areas in Spain
and Italy) may, after enlargement, no longer be eligible for EU regional
subsidies.Similarly,EU farm subsidies my well ﬂow away fromWest European
farmers and towards those in Eastern Europe after enlargement, possibly
upsetting cozy deals made under the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP). In
which case, we are likely to see stronger opposition to enlargement in the
poorer countries of the EU 15 and among affected populations, most notably
farmers.On the other hand,taxpayers in richer countries may well be reluctant
to countenance enlargement since they know they will likely be asked to
stump up yet more subsidy payments.Assessments of economic circumstances
– personal and/or national – may thus be tied to assessments of enlargement:
citizens going through tough economic times may want little or nothing to do
with enlargement (Gabel & Whitten 1997; Gabel & Palmer 1995).
A third and much newer strand emphasizes the increasing importance
of the EU’s institutions in shaping attitudes about integration. As the EU
has developed, its policies have become increasingly more likely to affect
the everyday lives of its citizens. As a consequence, there is growing public
concern about the EU’s ability to be responsive to citizen demands. For
example, Karp et al. (2003) ﬁnd that concerns about the democratic deﬁcit
and dissatisfaction with the EU’s current institutional framework serve to
shape attitudes about it. Similarly, Rohrschneider (2002) ﬁnds that concerns
about the quality of the democratic process constitute a serious liability to
Europe’s political integration. In this more evaluative view, voters use assess-
ments of EU institutions and their performance to shape evaluations of
more speciﬁc policies and developments.That is, rather than simply reﬂecting
either blind dislike or blind support for any kind of integration, responses
towards enlargement could reﬂect an assessment of how well the current EU
is managing or how well they expect a new European settlement will work.
Under this view, voter assessments will be framed in terms of the EU’s
own abilities and competencies implying that voters do see the EU as an
important and legitimate political institution. In that sense, broadening and
deepening may not be seen in the same way by voters if, for example, they
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unworkable.
Re-stating the preceding discussion in different terms allows us to pose a
series of questions. First, does the same model describe reactions to the two
faces of the European project – that is, do people see broadening and deep-
ening in the same way? Second, if people do make a distinction, then what
factors lead them to embrace one and not the other – especially for those who
support deepening but not broadening? Based on the preceding discussion,
there are three sets of explanations for why citizens might be reluctant to
embrace enlargement,two from the established literature on public opinion on
integration (at least as deﬁned to date in terms of deepening) and one that is
newer.
1. European orientations:People who express doubts are those who have a
strong sense of national identity/or weak sense of European identity.
2. Instrumental self-interest: A ‘euros and cents’ concern that the new
entrants will take away beneﬁts such as farm subsidies or jobs.
3. Institutions: Concerns about the effectiveness of Euro-institutions that
stand apart from identity politics or narrow self-interest.
If voters see the processes of broadening and deepening as complementary,
then the same model will describe public opinion whether our dependent
variable is attitudes towards deepening or enlargement. On the other hand,
there is scope for responses to enlargement and to deepening not to coincide
as illustrated in the 2 ¥ 2 typology displayed in Figure 1.The main diagonal is
the pattern in which voters see the two processes in the same way: Euroscep-
tics will oppose both broadening and deepening while Europhiles are likely to
support both broadening and deepening. In which case, popular attitudes to
enlargement conform to what we already know about popular attitudes
towards European integration.On the other hand,and of far more interest,are
the off diagonal elements in which we see those who we have labeled‘hesitant
Europeans’ who for various reasons may oppose either broadening or deep-
ening, but not the other.
The existing literature on citizen opinions towards the EU can speak to the
main diagonal elements:the lack (or presence) of a strong sense of nationalism
or the role of self-interest can push people one way or the other. Yet these
kinds of arguments cannot account for a more conditional acceptance of the
EU. Either people are nationalistic – and hence reluctant to support the EU –
or they are not. The off-diagonal elements in Figure 1 suggest a more condi-
tional process at work: citizens are supportive of deepening, but not
broadening. In order to explain these off-diagonal opinions elements, we
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what we have termed ‘hesitant’ or ‘conditional’ Europeans can be understood
in terms of the third category of explanation we outlined above – namely that
voters evaluate the effectiveness of EU institutions and then express support
or opposition to enlargement. Part of the reason for this is that existing
explanations are good at helping us understand opinions that fall on the main
diagonal, but that if voters make distinctions between broadening and deep-
ening, then these are not well explained by existing arguments since they
represent a much more conditional voter response.We suggest that the reasons
for conditional support will include the instrumental reasons that we suggest
above – namely citizens who believe that enlargement would bring economic
growth,but are reluctant to embrace initiatives such as the euro would fall into
the upper left-hand side of the typology. For example, the citizens in those
countries outside the euro zone (Britain, Denmark and Sweden) may oppose
the euro, but support expansion. On the other hand, a concern about the loss
of subsidies might make a citizen oppose broadening but favour deepening.
Aside from these material beneﬁts, citizens who have concerns about the loss
of their country’s inﬂuence in the EU may be likely to favour a more cohesive
but limited union. One of the major implications of the Nice Treaty, for
example, lies in institutional reforms needed in order to accommodate those
new members.For example,one of the important reforms was an extension of
majority voting in the Council that would presumably imply current members
Widen
   Against  Favour 
Against
Eurosceptic
National pride 
Lack of confidence in EU 
institutions
Hesitant
Instrumental reasons (i.e., 
economic growth) 
Deepen
Favour
Hesitant
Instrumental reasons (i.e., 
farmers, loss of subsidies, 
concern about weakening 
Union and effectiveness of 
institutions
Integrationist
European orientations 
Confidence in EU 
institutions
Figure 1. Expectations about preferences for European integration.
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would gain more votes in the Council suggesting that smaller countries would
have less say. Others who may fall into the hesitant category are those who
support deepening but believe that the EU’s institutions must be reformed to
cope with a larger union.
Our empirical work proceeds in three steps. First, we examine the distri-
bution of opinions according to the typology set out in Figure 1. We also
examine whether support for enlargement depends simply on what countries
are being considered. For some voters, one important rival hypothesis to the
question of enlargement is not so much a matter of ‘yes or no?’ but ‘who?’. In
other words, some new entrants may be seen as acceptable while others may
not. Not surprisingly, we ﬁnd that substantial numbers of voters lie on the
off-diagonal and,to a large extent,opposition or support of new entrants does
not hinge crucially upon the identity of the new entrants. Having made these
two points, we then turn to consider the factors that inﬂuence aspects toward
broadening and deepening in light of the arguments outlined above. Our
analysis relies on data from Eurobarometer 54 conducted in November and
December 2000 in each of the 15 Member States. In addition to the standard
questions used in the Eurobarometer, this data set has the advantage of
including several measures of attitudes toward European integration as well as
more speciﬁc questions measuring opinion about the entry of as many as 17
speciﬁc countries.
The Hesitant Europeans
As an initial assessment of the relationship between attitudes about broaden-
ing and deepening, we rely on two questions that ask respondents whether it
should be a priority to welcome new members (broaden) and implement the
single common currency (deepen).As Table 1 shows, there is greater support
for deepening than broadening; 59 percent believe it should be a priority to
implement the common currency,while just a third believes that it should be a
priority to broaden the EU.As we can see from Table 1,Europeans divide into
three camps: one staunchly pro-European, who comprise about a quarter of
the total; one staunchly anti-European, which also comprises about a quarter;
and a large middle group. Of those in the middle, about 20 per cent can be
considered unsure either about deepening or widening. This leaves a consid-
erable proportion that can be considered hesitant, expressing either a desire
for broadening or deepening. In the analysis that follows, we explore the
factors that inﬂuence these attitudes.While it may be too strong to talk about
a trade-off between opinions, it seems to be the case that a pro-integration
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not be terribly surprising to learn that voters who oppose the EU are likely
to oppose enlargement. It is a little more surprising, however, to learn that
pro-European feeling does not always translate into support for enlargement.
This group in particular could present a problem for the EU,and a potentially
serious one.
Attitudes about including speciﬁc countries
An aggregate-level analysis can take us some way toward understanding
how citizens in the EU view the inclusion of other countries. If attitudes
toward expansion are based on economic self-interest,richer countries should
enjoy greater acceptance than poorer countries. We might also hypothesize
that these attitudes will vary across the EU. Support is likely to be lower
when the difference in economic development between a candidate country
and a Member State is greatest. In addition to economic wealth, we also
examine whether support depends upon whether a country shares European
values as measured by a country’s respect for political rights and civil liberties.
For our analysis, we have selected a total of 12 countries that include the
candidate countries that either subsequently joined the EU in 2004 or those,as
in the case of Bulgaria and Romania, who ofﬁcially applied for membership.
Freedom House ratings are used to measure a country’s support for political
rights and civil liberties.
Table 2 presents the results of a series of regression models estimated in
each of the 15 Member States. For the most part, the results suggest that
popular support for admission does not depend on the characteristics of the
applicant countries. Wealth is only a signiﬁcant factor in three countries,
but the sign is only in the expected direction for Belgium. In Denmark and
Sweden, support is higher for countries where the economic gap is largest.
Table 1. Distribution of preferences for broadening versus deepening
Do not Broaden Unsure Broaden Total
Do not Deepen 23.0 2.6 7.9 33.5
Unsure 1.8 5.1 1.1 8.0
Deepen 30.6 4.7 23.3 58.5
Total 55.4 12.3 32.2 100.0
Note: Based on questions about whether it should be a priority to implement common
currency and welcome new members.
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driven by concerns about poverty.The effect of political rights and civil liber-
ties is more consistent,but is limited to three countries (Denmark,Finland and
Sweden). Denmark and Sweden appear to place the most emphasis on rights
and liberties and the overall ﬁt in both these countries is high: 0.65 and 0.62,
respectively. For most of the other Member States, the characteristics of the
applicant countries do not seem to matter. Instead, some citizens would seem
to have objections to or doubts about the very principle of enlargement.The
question is to what extent do attitudes toward enlargement simply reﬂect
attitudes toward European integration in general?
A model explaining attitudes toward broadening and deepening
We proceed by estimating a model that tests the arguments discussed above.
We constructed a single measure of deepening based on a summated scale
from four questions that state speciﬁc policy objectives for the EU. These
include the development of a common defence policy, the development of a
common foreign policy, and two questions about the implementation of a
single currency. None of these questions involve the accession of new
members, but all would involve an expansion of EU power and inﬂuence into
new areas (alpha = 0.72).To measure support for enlargement,we rely on two
other items in Eurobarometer 54 that concern enlargement and do not
mention the expansion of powers for the EU – just an expansion of members
(alpha = 0.61). So that the two models are comparable, this scale has been
divided by two, ranging from -2t o+2 (see Appendix for question wording).
To measure European orientations, we rely on a measure of European
identity and ideology.We also include a question asking whether respondents
express fears about the loss of national culture.We might also anticipate that
citizens who reside in the original six Member States will have quite different
views and expectations of European integration than citizens from countries
that entered later. Countries outside the euro zone are likely to be more
sceptical about integration, so a dummy variable is used to control for these
effects.
We rely on several measures to examine the role of self-interest. Concerns
over beneﬁts and costs of EU membership can be measured in a number of
ways. The Eurobarometer typically asks respondents to assess whether their
country beneﬁts in the following way: ‘Taking everything into consideration,
would you say that (our country) has on balance beneﬁted or not from being
a member of the European Union?’ Note that this question asks individuals to
evaluate the overall beneﬁts of membership (which might also include trade,
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beneﬁts that accrue from the EC budget (see also Anderson 1998;Gabel 1998;
Eichenberg & Dalton 1993: 514). A more narrow and objective indicator of
speciﬁc costs and beneﬁts can be determined by calculating the ratio of total
payments to EU to receipts (Begg & Grimwade 1998). Excluding spending
by the EU on administration, Germany has always been a signiﬁcant net
contributor.Other net contributors include Belgium,the Netherlands,Austria,
Sweden and the United Kingdom. Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal are
identiﬁed as net beneﬁciaries.We also include a term for farmers,a group most
readily identiﬁable as being affected by enlargement.Finally,population size is
used to test the hypothesis that bigger countries will see their inﬂuence diluted
by a larger EU.
To evaluate how the performance of the EU inﬂuences support,a measure
of institutional conﬁdence is used that is based on a series of questions about
trust in EU institutions.
3 One of the concerns of enlargement is that it will clog
already slow-moving institutions. If citizens think the institutions cannot cope
with more members, they are likely to oppose enlargement. It is important to
note that this set of concerns represents an evaluative response to the EU as
a political system.To evaluate the level of dissatisfaction with the EU’s demo-
cratic performance, we use a question asking respondents to evaluate their
satisfaction with democracy in the EU.Although there has been some contro-
versy over its validity,most recent studies agree that it is a measure of support
for regime performance (Linde & Ekman 2003; Karp et al. 2003). Finally, we
include a series of control variables (age, education, gender), all aimed at
controlling for spurious relationships.
The Eurobarometer data are based on samples of individuals residing in 15
countries. Because of the multilevel structure of the data, most conventional
methods of estimation will underestimate standard errors leading to a higher
probability of rejection of a null hypothesis.Therefore,we proceed by estimat-
ing models using robust standard errors clustered by country. The procedure
does not affect the coefﬁcients, but it does estimate more consistent standard
errors even when some of the assumptions about variance are violated.
Results
Results from this analysis are reported in Table 3. Many of the results are
straightforward and we can see similarities across the models. Pro-European
sentiment is,as we expected,correlated with support for both enlargement and
deepening.The effects of European identity carry the same sign in both models
and have similar effects. This is consistent with the pattern seen in Table 1:
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Deepening Broadening
Coefﬁcient
Robust
S.E. Coefﬁcient
Robust
S.E.
European orientations
European identity 0.28*** (0.02) 0.19*** (0.03)
Fear loss of national culture -0.11*** (0.02) -0.02 (0.03)
Left 0.00 (0.05) 0.06 (0.04)
Right 0.05 (0.03) -0.12*** (0.03)
Instrumental
Pessimistic about national
economy
-0.02 (0.02) -0.04* (0.02)
Country beneﬁts from
membership
0.29*** (0.03) 0.24*** (0.03)
Farmer -0.06 (0.10) -0.26* (0.13)
Fear loss of subsidies -0.05* (0.03) 0.05* (0.03)
Fear cost of expansion 0.00 (0.01) -0.30*** (0.02)
Population (logged) 0.05 (0.04) -0.04 (0.05)
Institutional
Difﬁculty in making decisions -0.03 (0.01) -0.18*** (0.02)
Reform institutions 0.17*** (0.01) 0.25*** (0.04)
Dissatisfaction with EU
democracy
-0.12*** (0.03) -0.11*** (0.03)
Lack of conﬁdence in EU
institutions
-0.34*** (0.02) -0.28*** (0.02)
Demographics
Age 0.00 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)
Education 0.09** (0.04) 0.11* (0.05)
Student 0.02 (0.05) 0.16** (0.07)
Female -0.13*** (0.02) -0.06** (0.03)
Contextual
Original six 0.29** (0.10) -0.29* (0.14)
Outside euro zone -0.62 (0.11) 0.28 (0.19)
Economic growth -0.01 (0.03) -0.03 (0.03)
Net contributor -0.14* (0.07) 0.20* (0.10)
Net beneﬁciary 0.22 (0.13) 0.32 (0.18)
Constant 0.44* (0.21) -0.15 (0.33)
Adj. R
2 0.38 0.23
N 13,629 13,629
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered by country. *** p  0.01; ** p  0.05;
*p 0.10.
Source: Eurobarometer 54, November-December 2000.
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Europeans and so will support or oppose a range of issues. We also ﬁnd that
concern about EU democracy and a lack of conﬁdence in institutions weakens
support for both deepening and widening.With one exception, all four meas-
ures are statistically signiﬁcant in both models and all have the same sign.
Education also has a positive impact on both aspects of integration,though the
impact is much larger on support for broadening.
We also see a number of sign changes that are especially important since
these are the group of voters that is much more hesitant in their support
of integration.Speciﬁcally we see that those on the right side of the ideological
continuum are against enlargement even though there are no ideological
differences on deepening. Similarly, the question of enlargement elicits a
negative response from both farmers and those respondents who fear the cost
of expansion. These last patterns are consistent with highly self-interested
motivations in relation to enlargement: enlargement threatens their beneﬁts.
Citizens from countries that are net contributors are less likely to favour
deepening and more likely to favour broadening,presumably due to an expec-
tation that other countries may lessen the burden.We expected citizens from
larger countries to be more sceptical about enlargement than smaller
countries. While the sign is in the expected direction, it is not statistically
signiﬁcant.The dummy variable representing length of experience in the EU
clearly reﬂects different priorities. Citizens from the original six Member
States are more supportive of deepening but less supportive of widening.
The ﬁndings above suggest that attitudes about enlargement may not be
the same as attitudes about deepening. To examine this question more thor-
oughly, we employ a multinomial logit model to test support and opposition
for a combination of speciﬁc policy proposals.The dependent variable is based
on cumulative responses to whether it should be a priority for the EU to
implement the common currency and/or enlargement (as in Table 1). The
same independent variables used above are included in the model.The results
are reported in Table 4.To ease the interpretation of the coefﬁcients, we also
report the derived probabilities for each of the outcomes in Table 5.To assess
the relative strength of the three explanations, we estimate the probability for
each outcome when all of the variables within each category are set at their
minimum and maximum values. Institutional concerns appear to create resist-
ance about whether either policy should be a priority rather than a preference
for one policy over another. In comparison, instrumental concerns have a
relatively strong impact in creating opposition to enlargement, while support-
ing further deepening.Speciﬁcally,the likelihood of opposing enlargement but
supporting the common currency increases from 0.26 to 0.46 when all of the
instrumental variables are set at their maximum.As the results in Table 4 show,
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Finally, European orientations appear to lead citizens to support both aspects
of integration, though the overall impact is rather small.
Discussion
The evidence presented thus far points to the conclusion that attitudes toward
European integration are multidimensional.While there is a group of citizens
who are either strong supporters of integration, whether directed toward
deepening or widening, and another group that is opposed to both aspects of
integration, the largest group of Europeans remains hesitant about European
integration, either expressing support or opposition for either deepening or
widening. Our analysis suggests that their reluctance to either oppose or
support both aspects of European integration is not caused by ambivalence,
but rather is inﬂuenced in ways that are consistent with instrumental self-
interest and EU performance. This has implications for the legitimacy of the
European project as it indicates that citizens are beginning to evaluate the EU
in terms of what it has delivered, rather than something that remains highly
remote and abstract.
The enlargement to the East offers both opportunities and challenges to
the building of the EU. For the Commission, enlargement almost seems to be
a natural step or stage in the evolution of integration.And for many European
citizens this also seems to be the case.Yet the Commission should not be too
quick to celebrate.One of the major drivers of public opinion towards the EU
is that of self-interest. Up until now, the EU has been able to rely on a series
of instrumental arguments that favour the EU itself – the arguments (made
both by the EU and national politicians) that membership means increased
trade, increased jobs and, in some instances, increased subsidies and price
supports and development funds. All of these played their part in building
support for the EU.And the EU itself seems to have spent many years trying
very hard to get Europe’s voters to take it seriously as a meaningful institution.
Now, however, enlargement may well bring those arguments into play in the
opposite direction and the argument of self-interest works against the EU’s
agenda even as it shows that voters are beginning to accept the EU as an
important and meaningful part of the political landscape.Voters,attuned to the
beneﬁts of EU subsidy, now understand they may lose something of value via
enlargement. Instrumental motivations may now work against the EU. The
good news from the point of view of the Commission is that this at least shows
the development of legitimacy for EU. The bad news is that the very same
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may help weaken support for the next stage of integration.
Appendix
Dependent Variables
I am going to read out a list of actions that the European Union could
undertake. For each one, please tell me, if in your opinion, it should be a
priority, or not?
Successfully implementing the single European currency,the euro (Table 1,
Deepening Table 3 and Table 4)
Welcoming new member countries (Table 1, Broadening Table 3 and
Table 4)
For each of the following countries, would you be in favour of or against it
becoming part of the European Union?
Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta,
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania (Table 2)
What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for
each proposal, whether you are for it or against it. (ROTATE)
There has to be a European Monetary Union with one single currency, the
euro (Deepening in Table 3)
The Member States of the European Union should have one common
foreign policy toward countries outside the European Union (Deepening,
Table 3)
The European Union Member States should have a common defence and
security policy (Deepening, Table 3)
The European Union should be enlarged and include new countries
(Broadening, Table 3)
European Orientations
‘Would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, not at all
proud to be a European?’ (European identity)
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place your views on this scale?’ [ranging from 1 to 10] (Left 1–4; Right 7–10)
Instrumental
What are your expectations for the year to come:will 2001 be better,worse or
the same, when it comes to...?
The economic situation in (OUR COUNTRY) (Pessimistic about national
economy)
Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (OUR COUNTRY)
has on balance beneﬁted or not from being a member of the European Union?
(Country beneﬁts from membership)
Some people may have fears about the building of Europe, the European
Union. Here is a list of things which some people say they are afraid of. For
each one, please tell me if you – personally – are currently afraid of it, or not?
The loss of our national identity and culture (Fear loss of national culture)
Less subsidies from the European Union for (OUR COUNTRY) (Fear loss
of subsidies)
Other countries joining the European Union will cost member countries
too much money (Fear cost of expansion)
Institutional
Thinking about the enlargement of the European Union to include new coun-
tries, do you tend to agree or tend to disagree with each of the following
statements? (ROTATE)
With more countries, it will be much more difﬁcult to make decisions on a
European scale (Difﬁculty in making decisions)
I am going to read out a list of actions that the European Union could
undertake. For each one, please tell me, if in your opinion, it should be a
priority, or not?
Reforming the institutions of the European Union and the way they work
(Reform Institutions)
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all satisﬁed with the way democracy works in the European Union? (Dissat-
isfaction with EU Democracy)
And,for each of them,please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust
it?
The European Parliament, The European Commission, The Council of
Ministers of the European Union, The Court of Justice of the European
Communities, The European Ombudsman, The European Central Bank,
The European Court of Auditors, The Committee of the Regions of the
European Union, The Social and Economic Committee of the European
Union (Lack of Conﬁdence in EU Institutions)
Notes
1. A second referendum, held in October 2002, was approved by a margin of 63 to 37 per
cent.
2. Cyprus also joined the EU in 2004.
3. Of all the EU institutions, the Court of Justice received the greatest conﬁdence, but still
more than half distrusted the institution. In contrast, just a quarter trusted the European
Commission,while 36 percent said they could trust the European Parliament.While these
aggregate differences may suggest that evaluation of each of the institutions varies across
individuals, a common factor analysis suggests otherwise. A single, very strong factor
emerges from the factor analysis, accounting for 80 per cent of the variance across the
nine measures (eigenvalue 7.2).This strongly suggests that individuals tend not to distin-
guish one EU institution from another.In other words,those who distrust the EP are also
likely to distrust other EU institutions. Initially each of the items was coded so that a
negative value was associated with distrust and a positive value with trust. Individuals
who are unaware of the institution or do not have an opinion were not included in these
measures. Taking the mean response over all of the institutions forms a single index
ranging from -1t o1 .
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